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CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCES
AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION
In Colonial Massachusetts, under the General Laws of 1672, the
letter "B" was branded on the forehead of every convicted burglar or
highway robber, and a "Vagabond Quaker" could 'be punished by brand-
ing on the shoulder.' This ignoble ancestor finds its modern counterpart
in criminal registration ordinances which, according to a well-docu-
mented survey,2 have been adopted by at least forty-seven cities and
five States in an attempt to aid law enforcement agencies in the preven-
tion and detection of recidivistic behavior.' This comment treats the
recent decision in Lambert v. California4 to determine its effect on
these ordinances and on other legislation not requiring proof of awareness
for conviction. Attention is also given to some unresolved questions
concerning the validity of criminal registration laws.
THE DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON
CRIMINAL REGISTRATION ORDINANCES
The defendant, Virginia Lambert, was arrested on a street corner
by two officers who, giving no reason, took her to a police station where
she was searched and interrogated for two hours. When no other
criminal conduct was revealed she was charged with failure to register
as a "convicted person" 5 as required by a city ordinance:
It shall be unlawful for any convicted person to be or
remain in the City of Los Angeles for a period of more than
five days, without, during such five-day period, registering
with the Chief of Police in the manner hereinafter prescribed.'
At the time of arrest the accused had been a resident of Los Angeles
for seven years and had been convicted in 1951 of forgery, a felony
1 MASS. COLONIAL LAWS 12-13, 62-63 (Whitmore 1887).
2 Note, Comprehensive Reqiew of Registration Laws for Felons, 103 U. PA.
L. REv. 60 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Comprehensive Review).
31d. at 60, 65. This study was conducted under a special grant and much
information was gathered by direct contact or correspondence with officials and
members of police forces of municipalities throughout the nation. Questionnaires
were sent to 406 cities, of which 246 responded.
Ohio cities having such ordinances as of 1954 are Akron, Canton, Cincinnati,
Columbus, Lorain, Shaker Heights and Springfield; id. at 108.
4355 U.S. 225 (1957). Lambert appears to be the only reported case on
the subject.
5A "convicted person" is "Any person who, subsequent to January 1, 1921,
has been or hereafter is convicted of an offense punishable as a felony in the
State of California, or who has been or who is hereafter convicted of any offense
in any place other than the State of California, which offense, if committed in the
State of California, would have been punishable as a felony ... " Los ANGELES
MUNICIPAL CODE §52.38 (1946).
6 Los ANGELES MUNICIPAL CODE §52.39 (1946).
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in California.' She was fined $250 and placed on probation for three
years, no willfulness, express or implied, having been shown with regard
to her failure to register. Noting the subjective innocence of the accused
and the absence of any circumstances which should have forewarned her
of a duty to register, the Supreme Court held that the action of the
State courts violated the due process requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Notice is required in a myriad of situations where a penalty
or forefeiture might be suffered for mere failure to act ...
The principle is equally appropriate where a person, wholly
passive and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar
of justice for condemnation in a criminal case ...
We believe that actual knowledge of the duty to register
or proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent
failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the
ordinance can stand.8 (Emphasis added.)
Criminal registration ordinances had their sources in fear of increas-
ing professionalism in crime and were first enacted in five California
and Florida cities in 1933, the Los Angeles ordinance being one of
these.' Generally, the ordinances require those who have been convicted
of certain crimes or of certain classes of crime to register with the local
police, providing information concerning their criminal history and cur-
rent activities. "The stated objective of criminal registration laws is
to aid the police in preventing criminal activities and apprehending the
perpetrators thereof,"'1 but "the actual practices show that the theory
is merely the facade for police harassment of individuals who have been
convicted of a crime." 1
What effect will the Lambert decision have upon the avowed
purpose and the actual use of these ordinances? It has been said that
the principle of the decision requires that police officers not make arrests
under the ordinance unless they can prove the citizen knew of the law
and that, therefore, the purpose of registration laws is rendered in-
7Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant, pp. 3, 4, Lambert v. California,
supra note 4. "The pervasive thrust of the ordinance is illustrated by the fact that
India's Prime Minister Nehru would apparently have to register if he came to
Los Angeles. In 1922, as the result of picketing . . ., Mr. Nehru was sentenced to
18 months' imprisonment for extortion, an offense which would have been punish-
able as a felony in California." Id. at 36.
8355 U.S. at 228, 229.
9 Comprehensive Re-view, supra note 2 at 61, 108.
101d. at 96. See, e.g., CODE OF THE CIrY OF COLUMBUS §34.16 (1952), where
it is declared in part: "many of the crimes herein defined are being committed by
habitual and dangerous criminals traveling from place to place throughout the
United States . . .and because the undisclosed presence of such criminals within
the city will constitute a serious menace ...it is the intention of the council in
the exercise of the police powers of the city to preserve by this article the public
peace, welfare and safety
11 Id. at 102.
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effective.' 2 This reasoning is clearly erroneous since it is not the duty
of a police officer to consider whether the person whom he is arresting
has the knowledge requisite for conviction. Yet it must be admitted
that theoretically the decision will tend to reduce the number of actual
registrations because the difficulty of proving subjective state of mind
is apparent; and the amount of this reduction will measure the degree
to which the avowed purpose has been undermined. But practically,
having amended their ordinances to incorporate the Lambert rule,' 3 if
actual registration is desired cities will have to publicize the registration
requirement through means available to them, and the resulting increased
registration might well counterbalance the failure to register by those
shrewd enough to understand the implications of the new rule.
It appears that a major, though unexpressed purpose of the frariers
of this legislation was to rid their cities of "undesirables" by forcing
them to move to locations where registration was unnecessary, 4 and in
the same manner to -prevent the further influx of such persons. Appar-
ently the rule of the principal case will not tangibly hinder this effect
of the ordinances.
In practice the requirement of criminal registration has been used
in many ways, for example; to detain a person for investigation of a
more serious crime for which there is insufficient evidence to hold him,
to suspend proceedings conditioned on defendant's leaving town, to force
co-operation by threatening prosecution, and to incarcerate undersir-
ables. 5 "The pattern of selective prosecution which was discerned in
some communities enables local authorities to use the ordinances as an
additional effective harassing weapon."'" The validity of these practices
will be considered infra, but assuming for discussion that they are valid,
their effectiveness is plainly not limited by a requirement that knowledge
be proved at the trial stage.
It follows that neither the avowed purpose nor the practical use
of criminal registration ordinances will be substantially impaired by the
decision in the principal case.
SIGNIFICANCE RELATIVE To OTHER LEGISLATION NOT
REQUIRING AWARENEss FOR CONVICTION
Mr. justice Frankfurter in a scathing dissent, in which he was
12 Petition for Rehearing for Appellee, p. 2, Lambert v. California, supra
note 4.
13 See, e.g., CODE OF THE CIr OF COLUMBUS §34.17 (1952) as amended Dec.
16, 1957, the date of the Lambert decision, by Ordiance No. 1587-57 to read as
follows: "Any person kno'wingly violating any provision of this article shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not to exceed five hundred dollars and by imprisonment for a period not
to exceed ninety days." (Emphasis added.) CITy BULLETIN, Dec. 21, 1957.
14 Comprehensiqve Rev.iew, supra note 2 at 63.




joined by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker, observed that
there are numerous laws under which convictions may properly be
obtained without showing that the person convicted was aware of the
law or that he was doing wrong, concluding:
If the generalization that underlies, and alone can justify,
this decision were to be given its relevant scope, a whole
volume of the United States Reports would be required to
document in detail the legislation in this country that would
fall or be impaired. . . . I feel confident that the present
decision will turn out to be an isolated deviation from the
strong current of precedents--a derelict on the waters of
the law.'
7
The purpose of this section will be to identify that "underlying generali-
zation" and to determine its "relevant scope."
It is clear that the majority opinion transfers the due process require-
ment of notice from its usual application to property interests in civil
litigation,'" applying it here to hold unconstitutional an act taken by
the municipality under its delegated police power. The resulting formu-
lation is that a person cannot be constitutionally convicted of violating a
criminal registration ordinance without proof of actual knowledge or
of the probability of knowledge that he had a duty to register thereunder.
In other words, scienter is an element necessary for conviction under
the ordinance. The dissenters clearly felt this to b in conflict with
established authority, the leading case of which, United States v. Balint,'9
held that the common law requiring of scienter has been modified:
. . . in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of
which would be obstructed by such a requirement. . . . Many
instances of this are to be found in regulatory measures in
the exercise of what is called the police p6wer where the
emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some
social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as
case of mala in se.
20
The term "public welfare offenses" was subsequently coined "to
17355 U.S. at 232.
18 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950),
statutory notice of judicial settlement of accounts held incompatible with require-
ments of Fourteenth Amendment as basis for depriving known persons whose
whereabouts are also known of substantial property rights; Covey v. Town of
Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1955), mere compliance with statute did not afford notice
to incompetent and subsequent taking of property would be without due process of
law; Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956), Due Process requires
a hearing for owner of property to be taken for public use and hearing is
meaningless without notice.
19258 U.S. 250 (1921).
20Id. at 251. See also Shelvin-Carpenter Co. v; Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57
(1909), trespass on state land to cut lumber after permit had expired. Note that
if, as concluded above, scienter does not "obstruct" the purpose of the ordinance
there is no justification for its elimination. Cf. Mackey v. United States, 290
Fed. 18 (6th Cir. 1923).
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denote the group of police offenses and criminal nuisances, punishable
irrespective of the actor's state of mind, which have been developing in
England and America within the past three quarters of a century.2
Seeking a basis for drawing the line between offenses requiring mens tea
and those which do not, Sayre considered and rejected statutory form,
gravity of the offense, and the mala in se--mala prohibita distinction.
He concluded that crimes created primarily tb punish the individual
commonly require mens rea whereas "public welfare offenses" com-
monly do not; but if the penalty "be serious, particularly if the offense
be punishable by imprisonment, the individual interest of the defendant
weighs too heavily to allow conviction without proof of a guilty mind."2 2 '
An examination of Sayre's elaborate classification and exhaustive docu-
mentation of "public welfare offenses" further confirms the suspicion
that violation 6f criminal registration statutes does not lie within the
ambit of that widely accepted phrase. The offenses are divided into
eight groups, the last being "violations of general police regulations,
passed for the safety, health or well-being of the community" ;23 but a
survey of the fifty-odd cases cited thereunder reveals that the violator
in every instance was engaged in some business or other activity which
was the object of the regulation, in contrast to the total passivity of the
defendant in the principal case.
It is clear that the traditional emphasis of the criminal law upon
protection of the individual has suffered a substantial alteration to meet
the needs of a changing society. But offenses punishable without mens
rea are, generally, subject to a light monetary fine 24 and "necessitate
enforcement against such armies of offenders that require proof of
each individual's intent would be virtually to prevent adequate enforce-
ment."'25 As a result "liability is based . . . upon mere actizity.12 6
(Emphasis added.) The Balint decision is proof that the Court is willing
to go still further and allow a heavier punishment upon proof of mere
activity. But the Lambert decision shows that the Court refuses to punish
morally innocent passivity. The majority opinion does not merit the broad
significance attributed by the dissent. Although lacking in preciseness,
it is marked by repeated references to the fact that the defendant was
being punished for conduct that was "wholly passive," "unaccompanied
21 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L .REv. 55, 56 (1933).
2 2 Id. at 72.
2 3 1d. at 84-88. The other groups are: (1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor,
(2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded articles,
(4) violations of anti-narcotic acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of
traffic regulations, and (7) violations of motor vehicle laws.
24 But compare the Balint case where a heavier punishment was "justified
only on the ground of the extreme popular disapproval of the sale of narcotics."
Id. at 81.
25 Id. at 72.
26 Id. at 78.
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by any activity whatsoever," and so forth. It is this very lack of activity
that distinguishes this case from violations of other registration laws.
2 7
The dissenters apparently feel that the majority opinion enunciates
a new rule that proof of actual awareness of what the law requires, or
of a sense of wrongdoing, is requisite to criminal conviction. It is
suggested that this conclusion was formed by reading, out of context,
the Court's statement that "Where a person did not know of the duty
to register and where there was no proof of the probability of such
knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with Due Process."
But it is clear from study of the opinion as a whole that the holding s
meant to apply only to this ordinance and to those which concern a
violator in a strictly analogous position. Moreover, the Court affirms the
general principle that ignorance of the law will not excuse and recognizes
the broad scope of the police power, merely noting that due process
necessarily limits its exercise.
The dissent further charges that Lambert represents "a return to
Year Book distinctions 'between feasance and nonfeasance . . . inadmis-
sible as a line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality." Does
the decision really draw such a line (admittedly invalid) or does the
accused's passivity have a more fundamental significance? The majority
does not hold that proof of an affirmative act is prerequisite to the
imposition of criminal responsibility. Its concern arises because such
responsibility was imposed on a person who was simply living as would
an average member of society. Mr. Justice Holmes, insufficiently quoted
by both majority and dissent in Lambert, reasoned as follows:
The reference to the prudent man, as a standard, is the
only form in which blameworthiness as such is an element of
crime, and what would be blameworthy in such a man is an
element:-first, as a survival of true moral standards; second,
because to punish what would not be blameworthy in an
average member of the community would be to enforce a
standard which was indefensible theoretically, and which prac-
tically was too high for that community.
28
A survey of Sayre's "public welfare offenses" shows that the
violators engaged in some business or activity which was objectively
immoral or would have warned the "prudent man" that it might be
subject to regulation. In such cases penalties are usually light, proof of
the facts is usually sufficient proof of intent, and an occasional injustice
is accepted as necessitated by the intolerable burden which would be
27 See, e.g., State of New York ex reL Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63
(1928), where member was prevented from attending meetings or retaining
membership in secret organization which had failed to comply with statutory
registration requirement; see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1953),
federal regulation of lobbying; United States v. Kahringer, 345 U.S. 22 (1952),
failure to register and pay federal excise tax on wagering.
28 HOLMES, THa ColmON LAw 76 (1381).
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placed upon the judicial process should allegation and proof of intent
be required. This proposition that even "public welfare offenses" punish
immorality, though of lesser degree, is illustrated by the notion of a
continuum, suggesting "a range in morality from the major moral
principles to the least of ethical norms."2
9
The point to be stressed is that the premise underlying
such legislation is that intent and negligence do in fact play
essential parts in such offenses .... The key to understanding
the petty offenses (and others where mens rea has been ex-
cluded) is, therefore, that they are designed to catch the wilful
and negligent; they are not intended to penalize sheer acci-
dent.20
Thus the relevance of passimty in the Lambert case is its negation of
the possibility bf immorality. During the time relevant under the ordi-
nance, the accused engaged in no activity or failure to act which would
be "blameworthy in an average member of the community." That of
course assumes that the average citizen after conviction and release would
not sense that his movements were probably subject to regulation and that
he should therefore inquire of the police as to his duties; no other as-
sumption seems justified.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that "there can hardly be a differ-
ence as a matter of fairness, of hardship, or of justice," between
punishment for unknowing violation of narcotics laws and for similar
violation of criminal registration laws. It is the state of "moral pas-
sivity" in the latter instance that makes the difference. It seems con-
sonant with "justice" and "fairness" to say that a narcotics handler
has a duty to society, and that the average citizen would recognize it
were he handling narcotics. The Court indicated as much in the Balint
case as it examined the basis of the legislation:
Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent
purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the
latter was the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless con-
sideration as to the opportunity of the seller to find out the
fact ...contributed to this conclusion.2 '
There is no such opportunity for the violator of a criminal registration
ordinance; there is nothing concerning his conduct to warn him that
he may have some special duty to society.
Having discounted the dire predictions of the dissent as to the
29 Hall, Prolegomena To a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 549,
566 (1943).
So ld. at 568, 569.
81258 U.S. at 254. In United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943),
Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing for the majority in an impure food case, observed
that Congress preferred to place the hardship "upon those who have at least the
opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the
protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce."
[Vol. 19
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effect of the Lambert decision upon the body of law represented by
the term "public welfare offenses," there remains the question of its
effect, if any, upon other statutes not requiring mens tea for conviction.
The Alien Registration Act, 2 although requiring wilfulness for
violation of its registration provision, does permit punishment for unin-
tentional failure to comply with a notice requirement of the Act.33 But
it should be noted that this Act is widely publicized by the government
and that Congress has long exercised special power with respect to aliens
under its power "To establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization.Y
34
It must also be admitted that an alien, by the very nature of his status,
is or should be aware that there are special duties placed upon him.
The Subversive Activities Control Act requiring Communist regis-
tration provides that:
.. .each individual having a duty . . to register or to file
any registration statement.., shall, upon conviction of failure
to so register . .. be punished for each offense by a fine of
not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than
five years, or by both.3 5
Thus, failure to register is in itself a violation subject to serious penalty.
But this enactment was found necessary because "the world Communist
movement [presents] a clear and present danger to the security of
the United States," 36 and applies to persons whose conduct would surely
warn the average citizen participating therein of the possibility that it
was regulated. This, combined with the wide publicity attending any
regulation of political activity in the United States, negatives any notion
that the Lambert formula has application here.
Modern social and economic developments have resulted in the
reduction or elimination of the requirement of mens rea in the field of
Jinancial transactions between the buying public and business interests,
which now seems to be looked upon as quasi-fiduciary relation. Con-
victions for using the mails to defraud in violation of federal statute
furnish good examples of this. It has been held 'that substantial 'fraud
depended upon the divergence between the promised performance and
the promisor's belief that he could perform, it being enough to pro'e
that the promisor had "no intention at all on the matter."3 " This
concept of individual duty in the public interest is of course one justifica-
32 66 STAT. 224 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1302 (1952).
33 66 STAT. 225 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1306 (1952). Note here that the Universal
Military Training Act punishes only those who "knowingly fail or neglect or refuse
to perform." 62 STAT. 622 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. §462(a) (1952).
34 U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 4. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
586 (1951).
35 64 STAT. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §794(2) (1952).
3064 STAT. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §781(15) (1952).
37 Knickerbocker Merchandising Co., Inc. v. United States, 13 F.2d 544, 545
(2d Cir. 1926).
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tion for our ever-expanding securities regulations.3" It must be admitted
that the average citizen undertaking such enterprises would appreciate
his special relationship vis-a-vis the investing public, and this admission
precludes application of the Lambert doctrine.
The foregoing analysis exposes the fears of the dissenters as un-
founded. The generalization that justifies the decision is simply that a
state of "moral passivity" cannot be punished consistently with due
process. Its relevant scope appears to be narrow enough to calm the
faintest heart. Far from being "a derelict on the waters of the law,"
the Lambert decision draws a just and sensible line beyond which legisla-
tive bodies may not constitutionally venture when sacrificing individual
rights for the common good.
SOME UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS OF VALIDITY
The Lambert case dealt with only one of a number of issues
which are raised by the enforcement of criminal registration ordinances.
Now that the ordinances have been subject to attack in the courts, and
if it is correct to conclude that the decision will not perceptibly hinder
their use, it seems highly probable that we will soon witness litigation
of -one or more of these unresolved issues.
Although there is no "typical" criminal registration ordinance, one
which is fairly representative applies to:
. . . every person Who comes into the city from any point
outside of the city, whether in transit through the city or
otherwise, who within the period of ten years prior thereto has
been convicted two or more times [of a felony] . . 39
Every such person must report to the police within twenty four hours
after arrival, furnish a description of himself, information concerning
his past convictions, where he is staying and for how long, and must
submit to photographing and fingerprinting; in addition, he must notify
the police by written statement within twenty-four hours after change
of address.
40
Compliance with such provisions, the resultant availability for
police "line-ups" and the very real possibility of damage to a person's
name and thus to his employment opportunities constitute undeniable
inroads upon constitutional rights and privileges. In Edwards v. Cali-
fornia4 the four concurring Justices felt that:
... it is a privilege of citizenship of the United States, pro-
tected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union,
either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of per-
manent residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship
3 8 Federal Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77 (1952);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78 (1952).
39 CODE OF THE CITY OF COLUMBUS §34.8 (1952).
40 CODE OF THE CITY OF COLUMBUS §§34.9-34.11, 34.13 (1952).
41314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means
nothing.4
2
The Edwards case concerned exclusion of "paupers" but it seems only
simple logic to apply the reasoning to enactments the unarticulated pur-
pose of which is to exclude the presence of ex-felons, and which at best
burdens the exercise of the "right of free transit."4  Further, the
ordinances limit the "right to liberty," protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, which "extends to the full range of conduct which
the individual is free to pursue.""' It would be pointless to survey here
the other individual rights and privileges, such as the "right of privacy,"
which may be limited by criminal registration ordinances.
What then justifies such interference with individual interests? It
can only be the assumption that convicted persons, because of recidivistic
tendencies, pose such a threat to society that they must be kept under
close surveillance even at ihe expense of certain of these interests. This
problem of recidivism raises a fundamental dilemma of criminology
which it would be futile to attempt to reconcile here, although a few
pertinent observations should -be made.
It has been stated that "The assurance with which criminologists
have advanced opinions regarding the causes of crime is in striking con-
trast to the worthlessness of the data upon which those opinions are
based." 4 5 If this is the state of criminology, the legislative and judicial
branches are met by an insuperable problem in attemptiig to weigh con-
flicting interests, since they simply do not know the extent of the public
interest at stake. So unsettled is the situation that opponents of the
ordinances may make thorough analysis of chosen studies and conclude
that "it is apparent that the crime rate for the general population is not
significantly less (and may be even greater) than that reported for first
offenders .... "
Only strict social defense theory can explain the rash of criminal
registration ordinances which have limited clearly defined individual
rights in favor of a supposed public interest which appears to be only a
shadow without substance. In fact, the ordinances defeat social defense
objectives insofar as well-meaning convicted persons are embittered by
this added burden upon their already difficult attempts at rehabilitation.47
It is significant to note here that many of the ordinances have a long
time limit (or none at all) upon their application, so that a record of
42 Id. at 183.
43 See Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1867).
44Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
45 MICHAEL & ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 169 (1933).
46 Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant, p. 40, supra note 7.
47 "The problem of recidivism is a serious one. Drastic legislation is not the
answer since it is passed in an atmosphere of hatred for the criminal rather than
one of helpfulness to society." BARNES & TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY
73 (1951).
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extended lawful conduct is no excuse for failing to register. Further,
the "honest" ex-convicts will be most burdened by the ordinances since
they will hasten to comply with the law, whereas the "hardened" crimi-
nal will surely not voluntarily alert the police to his presence.
The legislation under consideration is purportedly aimed at con-
trolling "professionalism in crime," "habitual criminals" and the like. It
has been held that to limit individual liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment a statute must be "reasonably restricted to the evil with
which it is said to deal." 4 It is highly probable that the broad scope of
some criminal registration legislation violates this rule and is therefore
unconstitutional. An ordinance limited to enumerated violent felonies,
to "habitual" criminals (e.g., those convicted at least twice of enumer-
ated felonies),, and to convictions within a reasonable period of time
would seem to answer the major objections, if punishable by a reasonable
standard. An elementary, yet fundamental, precept is that positive law
must be responsive to morals.
The moral obloquy and the social disgrace incident to
criminal conviction are whips which lend effective power to
the administration of criminal law. When the law begins to
permit convictions for serious offenses of men who are morally
innocent.., its restraining power becomes undermined. Once
it becomes respectable to be convicted, the vitality of the crimi-
nal law has been sapped.4
A further question of import is raised by the practical use of crimi-
nal registration ordinances, considered supra, as a facade for police
harassment of convicted persons. Even though a law is not discriminatory
on its face, equal protection is violated if its application is discriminatory.5"
The foregoing discussion reveals the constitutional quicksand upon
which stand many criminal registration ordinances. Much of this vulner-
ability would be outweighed if there were a more definitive public interest
at stake, but twenty years after the origin of the laws, the only thorough
survey of their operation reports:
It is questionable whether the registration of these per-
sons, even where a substantial number have registered, materi-
ally aids the police in preventing criminality or apprehending
criminals.5
4 8 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1956).
49 Sayre, supra note 21 at 79, 80.
5
oYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 362 (1886). See also Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257
U.S. 282 (1921).




The general rule that criminal conviction must be conditioned upon
proof of mens rea remains a necessary safeguard to individual rights and
should not be unduly diluted .by modern social and economic pressures.
The Lambert decision is valuable in that context, reflecting the basic tenet
that law must be responsive to morals by placing the status of "moral
passivity" beyond the scope of police power punishment. If properly
confined within its narrow scope, the decision will serve as a valuable
precedent, entirely consonant with prior authority.
It would seem probable that the brevity of the Court's opinion
mirrors judicial disapproval of the general tenor of the legislation. Be
that as it may, the questionable validity of these ordinances promises an
interesting future for them in the judicial process.
Wayman C. Lawrence III
